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Hostaged to the Voice of the Other:
Beckett's Play and Not I.
Tram Nguyen
1 After the Second World War, Beckett moves away from the modernist concern with
interiority, striving1, albeit ironically, in his late plays for a “porous” language (Beckett
1983, 172). In Play and Not I, characters are reduced to heads and mouths; they utter
their despair and confusion with visceral gusto, and yet there is no interiority to
ground their pain. Their words are spoken from a place that is pre-ontological, pre-
subjective. Through the spoken word, the summoning voice, language becomes ethical,
foregrounding the heteronomy of  the “I” and the Other.  According to  Levinas,  the
primordial, pre-personalized nature of the Other requires that we think “the ethical
relation beyond being”, for the Other is “the ethical excess” to which “I” am bound
(Marder).  Ethics  and  singularity  usurp  ontology,  which  re-installs  at  its  heart  the
centrality of the “I”. For Beckett, the acting “I” no longer signifies except to indicate
the approach to ethics, to the Other. Drilling into language, Beckett arrives at a site of
intersubjectivity that sustains the exteriority of the Other. Levinas calls this approach
the freedom of the Other, for it is a freedom that liberates the “I” from its mastering
impulse (1969, 39). In returning to Levinas's ethics and theory of metaphysical desire,
we see that Beckett’s rendering of fatigue and the speaking voice achieves an aesthetics
infused with the ethics of infinity and surplus.2
2 A student of Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas developed a first philosophy of ethics that
sets out the condition for the possibility of an engagement with an Other. This Other is
not  simply physically  and spatially  dissimilar  to  the “I”,  but  rather  asymmetrically
exterior (Perpich 106). Levinas coins the term alterity to designate the singularity and
absolute otherness of the Other which can never be reduced to our alter ego. In Totality
and Infinity, Levinas begins with a critique of “feeding”, the prevailing attitude that the
world, its objects, and its people are made available for our consumption (1969, 33).
Though we “need” to consume the other, this does not fill us; these desires are not
“pure”, not ethical (1969, 34). For Levinas, the most honest desire is not about lack, but
generosity. It is a desire that “desires beyond everything that can simply complete it”
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(1969,  34).  The  desire  for  the  Other  provides  no  opportunity  for  self-reward  or
satisfaction.  The  Other  is  not  constituted  by  my  knowledge  of  him,  or  by  my
intentionality,  but  by  my  respect  for  his  infinity  and  absolute  otherness.  Levinas
separates  himself  from  Husserl’s  phenomenology  by  clarifying  that  the  intentional
operation “is  always the same that determines the other” (1969,  124).  To make the
exterior world intelligible, the “I” assumes the position of “mastery exercised by the
thinker upon what is  thought in which the object’s  resistance as  an exterior being
vanishes”  (1969,  123-4).  This  “adequation”  is  fundamentally  contrary  to  Levinas’s
suppositions about the foundational core of ethics. In proposing that the Other is a cold
Stranger who “disturbs the being at home with oneself”, Levinas emphasizes that “over
him I have no power” (1969, 38-39). The non-attendance of power founds the condition
of an ethical intersubjective event. The recognition of the Other’s “irreducibility to the
I” marks his irreducible exteriority or non-coincidence, which summons the best in me
(Levinas 1969, 43). He calls me into an infinite ethical event that predates history and
time.
3 Infinity is central to Levinas’s ethics: as the overflow of being, infinity provides the
“optics” for  ethics,  teaching  us  that  there  is  being  prior  to  inscription  and
apprehension (1969, 23).3 Without infinity the “I” falls prey to adequation, thinking
those exterior to it are simply versions of itself, of the same (1969, 27). This is most
troubling for Levinas,  and much of Totality and Infinity redresses the premises upon
which the “I” and intersubjective experiences are thought. The destruction of the “I”
inhering in the face to face encounter, an irreducible relation of separated existences,
creates a habitat for ethics:  “the 'face to face'  position is  not a modification of the
'along  side  of  ...  '” but  an  acceptance  of  the  multitudinous  formlessness  of  lived
affectivity (1969, 79-80). Not simply a passive acceptance, the face to face thesis speaks
about a call from the Other that must be answered—because the presence of the Other
guarantees the “I” 's freedom. Lingis notes that the face “is not so much a mode of
appearing of the other, as a ‘trace’ where alterity passes” (xxi). This trace is infinitely
expressive,  perpetually  interrogative,  summoning  the  ethical  and  compassionate
desires  of  the “I”.  In essence,  the face and its  expansiveness refuse totalization,  or
external inscription (1969, 66). Levinas demands that the “I” always be in the labor of
the Other and the Other’s Others, “where the face of the Other becomes a passageway
to all the other Others” (Marder).
4 The  transcendental  face  to  face  relation  resonates  in  Beckett’s  critique  of  the
expressive power of the artist, who, face to face with his object, imposes his dominance
over it. Objecting to the notion that art is “expression”, by which he means mimesis or
representational bonds between the artist and the object, Beckett says, “All that should
concern  us  is  the  acute  and  increasing  anxiety  of  the  relation  itself,  as  though
shadowed more and more darkly by a sense of invalidity, of inadequacy, of existence at
the expense of all that it excludes” (1983, 145). Asking art to represent and to address
itself to the “occasions” of life obscures two things: 1.) the failure of representation,
and 2.) the obligation to act in the face of this failure. Here we see that Beckett’s terse
formulation of the artist and the object reverberates with a Levinasian notion of desire
as beyond what can complete or make whole the “I” who acts. In a helpless gesture
similar  to  Levinas's,  Beckett  describes  an  infinite  obligation  that  transcends
subjectivity. The ethical turn for Beckett is in “submitting” to the new understanding
of “relation”—that is, in embracing “this [new] fidelity to failure, a new occasion, a new
term of  relation,  and of  the act  which,  unable  to  act,  obliged to  act,  he makes,  an
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expressive act, even if only of itself, of its impossibility, of its obligation” (1983, 142).
These words are particularly foreknowing in light of Beckett's increasing involvement
with the staging of his plays, particularly. The obligation to act—as director or as actor
on a stage with his back against an inevitable failure—highlights a performance ethic
that moves beyond “self-indulgent fierceness and ...  in-your-face political and erotic
righteousness” embodied by a certain strain of “political theatre” (Erickson 10-11). The
responsibility for an Other, be it the audience or even the void beyond the stage, carves
out a theatrical imperative to broker the best nuanced understanding of freedom.4
5 By immobilizing his performers in their bodies or objects and by isolating them from
all context (as early as Murphy and as late as Rockaby), Beckett alters the relationship
between  space,  movement,  light,  and  sound.  On  the  stage,  without  the  crutch  of
gestures to capture the audience's attention, the restricted, broken body “introduces
force and dramatic tension, if only by contrast with the uselessness and insignificance
of movements in most plays” (Chabert 25). For instance, in Waiting for Godot, Lucky’s
physical  exertions  dramatize  the  body’s  burden and make  his  speech  all  the  more
astounding. When, after his speech, Lucky collapses as though emptied of life—and is
only revived when his basket and bag are placed back in his hands—we sense that he
makes meaning out of the failures of his body (1986, 44). Language, rather than matter
or organs, sustains the body.5 Beckett's characters face the difficulty of their bodily
restrictions  with  dark  humour  and  ontological  earnestness;  their  twitches,  blinks,
flapping, flailing, flinches and shudders take on the forcefulness of tectonic shifts so
that  when  they  do  speak,  words  offer  up  “salvation  [...]  sought  in  a  different
experimentum  linguae” (Deranty  175) .  The  “implacable  logic” of  these  constrained
body, according to Chabert, brings words “back to its vital organ: the mouth in a face
which utters words” (28).
6 While  the  body  fails,  language  and  ethics  speak  on.  Beckett  seemingly  divines  the
ethical call  of voices in Play and  Not  I—as the characters’  voices drift  upward, their
sound, meaning, and invocation disperse into our own lungs and enter our own organs.
Their monologues depend upon the aural staging of language, become what Deleuze
calls “soundings” rather than voice (1995, 10). These soundings, these voices, are not a
guarantee of individuality, but an indication that the work of signification is taking
place.  Dialogue  is  a  labor  that  presupposes  the  co-existence  of  the  “I”  and  the
Other. This co-existence is  foremost in the logic of language which “accomplishes a
relation between terms that breaks up the unity of a genus” of the self (Levinas 1969,
195). In doing so, language disrupts hierarchical ordering and “announces the ethical
inviolability of the Other” (Levinas 1969, 195.) When words are said, spoken, uttered as
a  gift  from  one  being  to  another,  speaking  “solicits  the  Other.  Speech  cuts  across
vision”  (Levinas  1969,  195).  For  Levinas  as  much  as  for  Beckett,  the  Other  is  an
interlocutor  who escapes  perceptual  apprehension.  In  a  medium married to  vision,
Beckett opts instead for a darkness that would spotlight the inadequacies of vision. His
is a theatre against visual satisfaction. He reveals to us in the darkness of stage and
theatre the “obligation to act”, to listen to the ethical summoning of the “stuttering”
voice (Deleuze 1994, 28).
7 The importance of  speech accounts  for  Beckett's  preoccupation with plays  and the
theater after the Second World War. In his important genetic reading of Play, Gontarski 
judges  that  Play  delineates  a  shift  in  Beckett’s  aesthetics  and understanding of  the
artistic  relation  (1999,  442-3).  Beckett's  numerous  revisions  signal  a  battle  with
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traditional conceptions of the work of art and the exigencies of staging words for an
audience. Dissatisfied with the German premiere of Play in 1963, Beckett worked closely
with George Devine on the English production, which debuted in April 1964. Though
Beckett wanted to set the “standard of fidelity”, his own collaborations with directors
or  with himself  (his  published texts)  brought  changes  to  original,  already finalized
texts (Gontarski 1999, 443, 447). Besides meticulous instructions about the size of the
grey urns and the intensity of the spotlight Inquirer, revisions to the play included the
volume, speed, and order of interrogation in the second act. As Gontarski surmises,
Beckett “was prepared to change and even at times substantially to rewrite a published
text based on the practicalities, the realities, the insights that working in a stage space
literally brought to light” (1999, 445). Beckett would continue to make changes to the
text of the play until 1978, altering the da capo ending to allow the Inquirer to disrupt
the order of  the inquiry (1999,  445,  448).  The “standard of  fidelity”,  then,  was one
established in conjunction with the vocalization of texts rather than measured against
the “objectivity” of published works. Changes to the rhythm, textual order, and tone of
the  play  came  from  Beckett’s  re-newed  understanding  of  the  speaking  voice  as
processual.
8 Play commences  with  a  description  of  “Front  centre,  touching  one  another,  three
identical grey urns about one yard high” (Beckett 1990, 307). Though the play kick-
starts with the idea of touching, it reveals itself in opposition to contiguity and more in
tune  with  asymmetrical  co-existence.  The  trapped  figures  of  Play  deliver  their
monologues  with  unceasing  rapidity;  they  speak  tonelessly  about  their  romantic
entanglement. There is obviously pain, but their words are marked largely by the need
to speak, as though speaking would enact a flight from their bodies, from their selves.
They respond when the Inquirer “interrogates” them, and they speak immediately.
Their delivery is staccato, pared down. Individually they re-tell the climactic events of
an indefinite moment, their faces “gone to age”, suggesting that this dilemma is old
and eternal (1990, 307).
9 The heads do not turn, do not address one another. Their words seem to emerge from a
place that is pre-ontological, rooted rhizomatically in the earth as they are rooted in
the  grey  urns.  Each  character  re-lives  his  or  her  memories  over  and  over  again,
unheeding  the  imperative  of  response  or  reciprocity,  voice  rising  “to  the  ghostly
dimension of an impersonal indefinite” (Deleuze 1995, 16). Elizabeth Barry, following H.
Porter  Abbott, claims  that  this  is  the  nature  of  the  “middle  voice”,  which  births
“agentless sentenceless” (Barry 116). Marjorie Perloff argues that Beckett's texts are
usually closed off in terms of sound and rhythm, causing a disintegration of order and
referentiality  (Perloff  204).  Though  their  fragmented  utterances  broach  nonsense,
nonsense is not simply the lack of sense; it is an attack on the imperatives of rationality
and  order  of  everyday  language.  This  is  the  making  of  Deleuze’s  third  phase  of
language, one rooted in the “force” of the Image (Deleuze 1995, 8).6 The language of the
“pure” Image counters the burden of reason, memories, and stories, “appear[ing] in all
its singularity, retaining nothing of the personal, nor of the rational, and ascending
into the indefinite as into a celestial  state” (Deleuze 1995,  10,  9).  All  subjectivity is
abolished,  but  voicing  remains  as  the  drive  of  dialogue.7 And,  according  to  Enoch
Brater,  “to be is  to be heard” (1987,  67).  Echoing Berkeley's  dictum “to be is  to be
perceived” (esse  est  percipi),  Brater's  comment speaks to Beckett's  addendum to the
notion that reality is conceived through sense perception received by the mind (Levy
225).  On the stage,  though Beckett’s  characters come to life when called upon by a
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spotlight and the audience’s expectation, they articulate to us their being through the
force of their voices.
10 The closed loop of words and utterances and the rapidity with which the heads utter
their thoughts or memories beg the listener (audience and Inquirer) to face, to host the
Other's pain. While there is little to ground our understanding: no time markers, no
continuous action, no social coordinates, the voice guides us (Deleuze 1995, 16). The
Voice that speaks reveals to us the necessity of engaging with the Other, calling upon
us to be listener rather than judge. As listener, we embody a “‘boundary condition’” of
ethics  and  comprehension  (Rayner  6).  Rayner  argues  that  “Like  the  syntax  of  the
pronoun, the ”audience“ is a shifter, changing both in what body it designates and in
what position: variously operating as an ‘I,’ a ‘you,’ an ‘it,’ ‘we’ or ‘they’” (Rayner 7).
Beckett tests us at these liminal edges of sense and forces us to work to understand
without violently imposing our own intentions.
11 Against all appearances, the audience and the spotlight Inquirer of Play act as hostage
to the speakers’ voices. The Inquirer shines a faint light on their three faces and they
are compelled to speak their fragments. They speak for three seconds, and are then
plunged into near blackout. Five seconds later the Inquirer's light summons all three
faces  again,  as  though  it  were  experimenting  with  listening,  with  a  new  form  of
dialogue. Unable to understand the three voices when together, the Inquirer begins to
train its spotlight on the faces individually: Woman 1, Woman 2, Man, and so on, in
varying orders. Beckett's Inquirer has the function of the interrogator, but it is also the
listener and the “victim” of the voices, the voice’s Other (Gontarski 1999, 444). Through
the Inquirer, we are confronted with the face to face relation that transports us into
the ethical realm. Beckett generously positions us alternately as “I” and the Other’s
Others.8 The voices inflict upon us and the Inquirer their speech, their alterity, and we/
it must attempt to decipher and to answer the call; the Inquirer is the “I” here and the
audience is the Other’s Others. The voices, our Others, seem to carry on their stories
even when the Inquirer is not on them, for when the light calls them to life they speak
more and more in fragments. “I said to him”, W1 utters, “Give her up. I swore by all I
held  most  sacred—”;  on her  second turn,  she  says,  “Though I  had him dogged for
months by a first-rate man, no shadow of proof was forthcoming ...” (Beckett 1990,
308). In turn, W2 says, “Her parting words, as he could testify, if he is still living, and
has not forgotten” (1990, 309). But there is no testimony, no answer from the other
characters  that  matters.  Indeed,  all  the  characters  inhabit  a  solipsistic  existence:
though M is next to her, W2 only hears herself.
12 The Inquirer trains its light in the manner of a child learning to operate a new toy,
clumsily  and  curiously,  employing  the  spotlight  to  verify  and  to  fill  in  gaps  of
understanding:
W1: I confess my first feeling was one of wonderment. What a male!
[Spot from W1 to M. He opens his mouth to speak. Spot from M to W2.] (Beckett 1990, 309)
13 Indeed, the Inquirer exercises its power with humour and wit. The Inquirer attempts to
give each figure its due in the first half of the first act, which is still narratively driven,
with the three voices composing a sensible history of the trio. This triadic narration
becomes impossible after the climatic bonfire of M's things (1990, 311). The Inquirer at
this point plunges the heads into darkness and the play begins again with the three
voices speaking in unison, as in the beginning. However, the heads speak in shorter
fragments as the Inquirer loses patience, or loses the ability to listen with compassion
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and sincerity. W2 says with desperation, “Are you listening to me? Is anyone listening
to me? Is anyone looking at me? Is anyone bothering about me at all?” (1990, 314).
Meanwhile, M thinks, “I know now, all that was just ... play. And all this? When will all
this—” ... “have been just play” (1990, 313). At this point, the audience’s obligation to
the voices is stretched to a maximum; Beckett tests our generosity. The audience as
listeners must prick up their ears to the “murmurs of past voices not entirely absent
and the babble of  presences which do not  yet  have a  language in which to speak”
(Janus 186).
14 As the voices and their words get more desperate and the pace of the inquiry escalates,
the audience is compelled, summoned doubly to respond, to take the place of the “I”
that is hostage to the voices, which, in their desperation to be heard, lose their ability
to act or re-act towards one another: W1 despairs, “And that all is falling, all fallen,
from the beginning, on empty air. Nothing being asked at all. No one asking me for
anything  at  all”  (1990,  314).  Trapped  in  their  solipsism,  their  utterances  become
enervated and nonsensical. However, nonsense works to threaten the orderly habits of
logic. Sense and intelligibility do damage to the “I”: “Clarity is the disappearance of
what could shock”,  of  anything that  moves or  enlivens the “I”  (Levinas 1969,  124).
Beckett  himself  says,  “My  writing is  pre-logical  writing.  I  don’t  ask  people  to
understand it logically, only to accept it” (quoted in Knowlson 2006, 109). According to
Patrick Bowles, Beckett talked “of his books as if they were written by someone else. He
said that it was the voice to which he listened, the voice one should listen to” (quoted
in Knowlson 2006, 109).
15 In the intersubjective experience staged by the play,  wherein the audience and the
Inquirer  complete  the  linguistic  triad,  a  metaphysical  ethics  is  established  as
paramount  to  being.  Called  to  witness  the  rare  instance  of  someone  risking  him/
herself,  we experience not the call to empathy, but responsibility to the Other. The
ethical relation here is one of listening and answering, if silently, the call of the Other.
The irreducibility of the Other’s voice drives the urgency of Play and reveals the infinite
“pleating” of  ethics  (Marder).  Through  a  razing  of  context  and  sense,  of  social
coordinates  and  individuated  memories,  Beckett  is  thus  able  to  achieve  what  he
wanted: language as a divining, “mantic instrument” (cited in Brater 1987, 194). The
characters' utterings create for the listening audience the double folding of the voices'
individuality and generality. In a propulsive rhythm of words rising and descending
like crashing waves—W 1 asking if she should “Bite off my tongue and swallow it? Spit
it out? Would that placate you?”; W2 demanding in quick succession, “What do you do
when you go out? Sift?”; and M pondering, “Have I lost ... the thing that you want? Why
go  out?  Why  go—” (1990,  315),  the  heads  call  upon  the  listener  to  awaken  to  the
singularity of each voice. Likewise, in Not I, Mouth’s fragmentary cataclysm of words
exceeds subjective containment and advances a singularity that is heteronomous but
also  universal  and characteristic  of  all  beings.  It  is  not  simply  words,  codified  and
signifying,  that  speak to us  but  the act  of  sounding.  M's  uncontrollable  hiccupping
throughout the play arouses a kind of visceral reaction related to a sensing of bodily
discomfort. Hiccups, which are the result of an unbalance in the diaphragm, represent
the convulsive imbalance of a distinct and irreducible being. Similarly, Mouth’s distress
forces us to confront the asymmetry and exteriority of an Other. As Meir argues, “Face
to face with the Other, the priority and tranquillity of the same is put into question”
(Meir 262).
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16 In Not I, the image of Mouth, first served by Jessica Tandy, then by Billie Whitelaw, is
projected against a dark background.9 Reciting in the third person the details of a life
from  birth  till  death,  Mouth  speaks  in  hyperventilating  bursts,  “mouth  on  fire”
(Beckett 1990, 378). Mouth is haunted continually by a self-correcting mechanism that
repeatedly interrupts her outbursts, causing her to pause and exclaim “what?” and to
deny another impulse (1990, 377). With great excitement, Mouth narrates the change to
one  who  “had  never  …  on  the  contrary  …  practically  speechless  …  all  her  days”,
concluding “how she had survived!” (1990, 379). The voice, the act of speaking, the way
one forms “certain vowel sounds”, the “lips moving … the cheeks … the jaws .... the
whole face … the tongue in the mouth” are experienced as fundamental and primordial,
above the actual words, or “what one is saying” (1990, 380).10 Beckett's wonderful and
deliberate rejection of sense in favour of the “contortions” and “machine” of speaking,
of voicing, with painful abandon, celebrates the body's capacity to labor, to do. While
the brain “begs” Mouth to stop in order to “make sense of it all”, Mouth cannot because
it was something she “had to do” (1990, 381). Following Levinas, Marder argues that
“labor,  as  well  as  noisy  monotony  of  non-sense  and  the  element,  challenge  and
ultimately flatten the subjective, conceptual, and ontological borders” to reveal the site
of ethical responsibility to the Other as well as the Other’s Others.
17 Mouth's parents are “unknown”, the father having “vanished … no sooner buttoned up
his  breeches”  (1990,  376).  She  is  “spared  love”—as  though love  was  punishing  and
necessitated submitting one’s self to another (Beckett 1990, 376). Beckett reasons that
“There is more than a difference of degree between being short, short of the world,
short of self, and being without” (1983, 143). Here Beckett points to a radical asceticism,
for “being without” denotes being-without-lack or covetous needs. Beckett’s sense that
“being without” is not an impoverishment transforms our understanding of Mouth’s
late  linguistic  development.  At  an  age  between sixty  and seventy,  near  death  or  a
stroke, she hears buzzing and “realized words were coming” (1990, 377). Unable in the
past to speak in court, when she is judged and stared at, censured for getting “half the
vowels wrong”, Mouth is able to speak—finally—when crippled, near death, faced down
on the grass one April morning (1990, 376, 381). And through the deluge of her words,
she produces a rupture in the fabric of sense, a rupture which forces us to confront our
ethical convictions about the masterful speaking subject. Here is the “indication that
language takes place”, that sounding is an event which colludes to make the subject
part of an intersubjective, ethical network (Agamben 32).
18 Mary Catanzaro observes that the speaking voice is “external to Mouth” because of a
dis-identification with her femaleness (36, 41). In the language of Kristevan jouissance,
Catanzaro  argues  that  after  being  “condemned  to  silence” by  the  symbolic  order,
“Mouth's  text  is  not  fantasy,  it  is  desire,  the  surplus  unaccounted  for” (42,  40).
Cantazaro  suggests  that  excessive  desire  is  particular  to  the  feminine,  one  that  is
suppressed by patriarchy. However, in Beckett, desire is not the desire to be initiated
into the social symbolic, even as excess, but, rather, to act even in the knowledge of
failure; and, perhaps, to merge with the Infinity of the ethical. In fact, Mouth can be
seen  as  pre-eminently  ethical,  for,  having  been  systematically  alienated  and
disenfranchised, she rises to a radical impersonality through the labor and force of her
voicing. The  darkness  which  surrounds  Mouth  structures  the  audience’s  encounter
with her mainly as sound rather than figure, as “the anonymous rustling of the there is”
(1969, 159-160). The there is, according to Marder, “announces the anonymity of the one
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who labors” in favour of the singularity of that which she creates. Her voice is a point
of convergence and divergence, of folding and enfolding; in the instance that Mouth
voices, she initiates an event of ethics and being, sounding the “pure indication that
language is taking place” (Agamben 34). According to Agamben, “Being is in the voice
(esse in voce) as an unveiling and demonstration of the taking place of language” (35).
However, metaphysics has hollowed out the voice of mere sounds in order to turn it
into Voice. This hollowed Voice “goes to the ground and disappears in order for being
and language to take place” (35). The grounding of the animal voice as “the originary
articulation  (the arthron)  of  human  language” creates  a  fundamental  negativity  and
violence in the heart of being (32).11 For Agamben, uncovering the “mystery” of the
grounding of the Voice makes the violence of the originary moment surface, and, in
doing so, neutralizes the “sacrificial mythogeme and […] the ideas of nature and culture, of
the unspeakable and the speakable, which are grounded in it” (106). Agamben ends Language
and Death with the joyous proclamation, “So, language is our voice, our language. As you
now speak, that is ethics” (108). Agamben and Levinas both judge the praxis of speaking
to be the ethical cartilage between “I” and the Other. In the instance that one voices,
one enters into ethics and being with the Other.
19 Indeed, Beckett raises the promise that every speech act,  every voice produces and
necessitates an ethical response, which requires tearing down the assumptions about
the I and the Other. His “orphic” conceit, for Daniel Katz, “give[s] voice to something
that is constitutionally mute, to give a body to that which is incorporeal” (Katz 12). And
though Herbert Blau may be right in saying that Beckett champions a “tradition of
sometimes disdainful sometimes disconcerted ambivalence toward the audience”, why
is it the case that audiences do not turn away (34)? It is because Beckett's disembodied
voices crack the calm façade of language and show us the infinity of the Other. They
summon “a being capable of receiving a revelation, learning that he is created” a moral
being not  by God,  necessarily,  but  by his  relation to the Other (Levinas 1969, 260).
Levinas suggests that “we are not free to distance ourselves from him or her” because
our primordial responsibility for him or her generates “the impossibility of evading the
neighbor’s call” (1996, 95).
20 The built-in Auditor in Not  I,  a  facet  on which Beckett  wavered (in published texts
leaving its presence, but in performances removing it),12 suggests the importance of the
speaker-voice-listener  triad.  With  the  Auditor  removed  in  productions,  it  is  the
audience who hear the summons of the Other and they prepare themselves to respond
(Atterton  190).  The  Auditor,  an  indeterminate  figure  draped  in  black  “downstage
audience left”, watches Mouth intently and raises its arms at four crucial moments in
“helpless  compassion” (Beckett  1990,  375).  These four  moments  occur when Mouth
must stop her verbal onslaught in order to answer the interior-other who seemingly
challenges her about the third person pronoun she employs: “she found herself in the
—...what? .. who? .. no! ... she! ...” (1990, 377). The challenge from the inside and the
compassionate reception from the outside subvert the normative expectation that the
unified subject must defend herself from the outside world, that the Other is the hostile
enemy. The audience and the Auditor, like the Inquirer of Play assume crucial roles as
hostaged to the speaker.  Levinas deems this “hospitality”,  in the sense that the “I”
must, in the face of the other, create space for the alterity of the Other. Instead of
submerging the Other into the “I”, Levinas invites us to let the Other escape and to
allow the infinity of our responsibility to guide us, because “The absolute experience is not
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disclosure but revelation: a coinciding of the expressed with him who expresses, which is
the privileged manifestation of a face over and beyond form” (1969, 27, 67).
21 According to Levinas, in an oft quoted interview
The best way of encountering the other is not even to notice the color of his eyes!
When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in a social relationship with the
Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what
is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that. (1985, 85-86).
22 Furthermore,  he  clarifies  that  the  subject  is  bound by  the  double  logic  whereby it
comes into being and devolves on its responsibility for the Other and “it answers to the
point  of  expiating  for  others”  (Levinas  1985,  100).  In  the  darkness  that  surrounds
Mouth, we are indeed hostaged to her alterity. She escapes us, but she reveals to us the
ethical relation. Revelation through the face to face relation is a form of teaching that
does  not  depend  upon  vision—the  traditional  mode  of  accessing  the  Other  which
maintains the Other under my domain or reference. And of course this is singularly
compelling: Beckett's characters risk exposing their vulnerabilities and voicing their
basest instincts and actions. While Daniel Albright argues that Beckett’s “characters [...]
aren't  images  of  human  beings,  but  flimsy,  jury-rigged  theatrical  conveniences,  all
dreck and bricolage”, they not only represent some of the most memorable characters
in literature, but also some of the most empathetic and compassionate (Albright 25).
23 In  the  iconic  Beckettian  phrase,  “I  can’t  go  on.  I’ll  go  on” (expressed  in  both  The
Unnameable and Waiting for Godot), we see that the desire to give up versus the necessity
of  persisting  stages  a  primordial  wrestle  with  responsibility—to  the  “I” and  to the
Other. Beckett's writing emerges from the tension between the characters' knowing
and unknowing recognition of this responsibility.  This pre-cognitive knowing opens
out into the face of the Other and comes into being in the very staging of Beckett’s
plays.  Beckett’s  desire  for  directorial  involvement  puts  into  practice  this  ethic  and
constitutes  another  fold  in  the  creation  of  the  voice  in  his  work.  In  productions,
Beckett's voice fascinated actors and yet he abhorred having it recorded and played
back to him. He thought his voice too sentimental (Knowlson 2006, 150). But whenever
he gave in to pleas from his actors to read a certain passage from his plays, they were
invariably mesmerized by his intonation, pacing, timber, and delivery (Knowlson 2006,
188, 210). It wasn’t simply a matter of authoritative versions. It was because Beckett’s
words came from his voice and hearing Beckett’s voice gave the actors a glimpse into
the work of the voice not only to communicate sense but to speak the unsayable, the
naked word.13
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NOTES
1. H. Porter Abbott has shown in Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author and the Autograph
that the rhetoric of “onwardness” and “striving” is deployed with much skepticism in
Beckett's  writing  (36,  38,  39).  Abbott  judges  that  as  early  as  Malone  Dies,  “Beckett
introduces the trope almost as if to signal his own emergent sense of an oeuvre” that
would feel the Victorian drive for progress “as a whip” (36).
2. Deleuze speaks of this fatigue as an exhaustion of means, a depletion of cultural
modes of meaning and of saying. He says, “To exhaust words, one must relate them to
the Others who pronounce them—or rather, emit them, secrete them—following the
flows that alternately intermingle and become distinct” (1995, 7). In evacuating words
of sense and subjectivity, Beckett bores “one hole after another” in language to get to
formlessness (1983, 172). 
3. Critiquing  Heidegger’s  subordination  of  “the  relation  with  someone,  who  is  an
existent,  (the  ethical  relation)  to  a  relation  with  the  Being  of  existents,  which,
impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of
knowing)”, Levinas instead argues for ethical justice. This justice “involves obligations
with regard to an existent that refuses to give itself, the Other, who in this sense would
be  an  existent  par  excellence”  (1969,  45).  In  other  words,  Levinas  opposes  the
neutralization of the Other in the aid of conquering or thematizing it.
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4. My reading is in opposition to a line of interpretation which sees Beckett’s work as
punishing the audience. For example, Davies argues that “Destabilizing his audience
also allowed Beckett to wield greater control, to impose his authority both on and off
stage” (82). Davies’s judgment seems to suggest a sado-masochistic relation between
the director and the audience which contradicts Beckett’s desire to produce primordial
connectivity.
5. This is more visible in narrative works such as Texts for Nothing, in which the narrator
says, “I say to the body, up to you now, and I can feel it struggling, like an old hack
foundered in the street, struggling no more, struggling again, till it gives up” (Beckett
1997, 100). Beckett’s bodies fight their decrepitude in order to make meaning beyond
symbolic signification.
6. The three stages of language in Beckett's writing advance from 1.) the enumerative
language of The Unnamable, 2.) the atomic language of middle texts like How It Is, 3.) the
ceaseless, impersonal flow of Worstward Ho and Not I (Deleuze 1995, 8). In the face of this
incessant, criss-crossing flow of language, the Other and the I “are the same person, the
same  dead  foreign  language”  that  can  only  play  witness  or  pay  homage  to  the
expansion of a pre-ontological moment (Deleuze 1995, 8).
7. In Endgame, Clov and Hamm consider: “Clov. What is there to keep me here? Hamm. 
The dialogue” (Beckett 1986, 135). However, unlike Davies, who observes that “Driving
the dialogue is the characters’ terror that they are becoming invisible, unattended”,
this moment signals to me the centrality of sounding oneself into being (Davies 80). 
8. Careful  not  to  allow  the  reduction  of  exteriority  into  a  single,  totalized  Other,
Levinas  increasingly  formulates  Other  (l’Autre)  as  Other’s  Others  (l’Autrui),  but  not
consistently,  thus  creating  much  difficulty  for  his  translators  (see  Critchley,
Bernasconi, and Peperzak’s “Preface” to Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings,
xiv).
9. See Knowlson and Knowlson’s Beckett Remembering, Remembering Beckett, 169-171.
10. In Breath, a play which Beckett wrote in a fury when provoked by a question about
the progress of his writing, a cry of “recorded vagitus” is heard when curtains open
(Beckett 1986, 72). Besides “miscellaneous rubbish” scattered on the stage, no figure or
character appears, only this primordial recorded voice.
11. Agamben’s desire to correct a tradition of metaphysical violence challenges Hegel
and Heidegger equally. He remarks that the Hegelian dialectical process of negation
conceives of being, “inasmuch as it always takes place in a having-been, in Gewesen, ...
[as] a pure nothing” (37). On the other hand, Heideggarian separation of language and
voice, of “the living being” and Dasein, results in a paradox, “that the very absence of
voice in Dasein, the very ‘empty silence’ that Stimmung revealed, now reverses itself
into a Voice” and shows itself as inextricable from death (59). In other words, ontology
is governed by a negativity from which it attempts to hide and recover.
12. See Gontarski’s “Beckett's Play, In Extenso”, 445.
13. My  favourite  anecdote  about  Beckett’s  voice  is  one  included  in  Knowlson  and
Knowlson’s Beckett  Remembering,  Remembering Beckett.  When charged by an American
academic of not caring about people, about his audience, Beckett, retelling the incident
in a quiet tea room in an elegant old hotel in Paris shouted, “But I do give a fuck about
people! I do give a fuck!” (cited in Knowlson 2006, 206). And that is Beckett’s voice.
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ABSTRACTS
In his later theatre works, Beckett denudes language of the physical body in order to spotlight
the singularity of the voice. Reduced to heads and mouths in Play and Not I, Beckett’s figures utter
their despair and confusion with visceral gusto, yet there is no interiority to ground their pain.
As the voices drift upward and enter our own lungs and organs, the vocalization of their pain
summons us to a moment of ethical exchange, for Beckett obliges our compassionate listening.
We witness the rare instance of someone risking him/herself and exposing vulnerabilities. And,
in witnessing,  we embrace our ethical  responsibility to the Other.  Employing the “optics” of
Levinasian ethics, I will argue that Beckett recuperates an intersubjectivity grounded in a radical
responsibility to an Other’s humanity.
Dans ses œuvres dramatiques publiées à la fin des années 1960s, Beckett sépare la langue du
corps  physique  pour  mettre  en  lumière  la  singularité  de  la  voix.  Dans  Play  et  Not  I,  des
personnages réduits à des têtes et à des bouches expriment leur désespoir, leur confusion avec
une force viscérale bien qu’ils n’aient pas de corps physiques pour enraciner leur douleur. Quand
les voix montent et pénètrent nos organes, leur douleur devient un moment d'échange moral car
Beckett nous contraint à une écoute compatissante. Nous sommes les témoins privilégiés d’un
individu  qui  prend  des  risques  et  devient  volontairement  vulnérable.  Au  travers  de  ce
témoignage, nous acceptons notre responsabilité morale envers l'Autre. A cet égard, nous nous
servirons de Levinas pour montrer que Beckett s’approprie une intersubjectivité fondée sur la
responsabilité radicale envers l’Autre.
INDEX
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